XXXI Международный конгресс ИИСАА. 23–25 июня 2021 г. Т. 2

252 XXXI Международный Конгресс по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки Секция XVIII entities in 1990 was superficial; the marginalization of the South, much weaker economically and politically, led to the civil war in 1994. It resulted in purging the South officials and officers from the state and military service. This created strong anti-Northern feelings in the South, which paved the way for the raise of structures with a separatist agenda, such as the Southern Transitional Council. Given a heavy external support to the Southern separatists by the UAE, the likelihood of re-emerging of the independent ‘South Yemen’ in the short-medium perspective remains high. 2. Shiite – Sunni dichotomy. The Zaydi Shiites consist ca. 35%and the Sunnis ca. 65%of theYemeni population; however, in the North Yemen the number of the Shiites is close to 50%. Moreover, since Yemen for many centuries was a Zaydi Imamate, the influence of the Shia and their proportion in the local elite was high. As the Houthi movement is a modern adaptation of the Zaydi doctrine, they enjoy support of the majority of the Shia com- munity in Yemen; as well as of some part of the Sunni population in the North who were traditionally loyal to their former Zaydi masters. This remains an important factor behind preservation of the strong positions of the Houthis in North Yemen till now. 3. Al-Islah party vs. the Houthis and the Government of Yemen. In 2014 the Houthis destroyed the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood -influ- encedAl-Islah party, forcing their leaders to emigrate, mainly to SaudiArabia. Though Al-Islah lost power in North Yemen to the Houthis, they kept their influence inside the official Government of Yemen and its military forces. Despite a negative attitude of SaudiArabia to the Muslim Brotherhood in general, until recentlyAl-Islah enjoyed a certain Saudi support, which caused a strong critique by the Southern Transitional Council and UAE who designated it as a terrorist organization. Recent developments indicate a consolidation of Al-Islah dominance over the military in the strategically important Ta‘izz region, were they confronted the mainstreaming Government of Yemen forces, thus further undermining the Government positions in the country. 4. The issue of the legitimacy of power in Yemen. The Government of Yemen and President Hadi legitimacy is based on the interna- tional recognition, as well as on the political, financial andmilitary help of SaudiArabia. However, Hadi’s long absence from the ground, residing mostly in Riyadh, and open Saudi support to him, produced a strong feeling that his Government is merely a puppet of Saudi Arabia, thus further undermining his legitimacy in the eyes of a large portion of the Yemeni population, who traditionally disliked Saudi Arabia, at least since the perceived occupation of three northern provinces of Yemen in 1934. Besides, though still enjoying some support in his nativeAbyan and partiallyAden, Hadi is not popular in SouthYemen either, since during theCivilWar of 1994 he took the side of President Saleh (i.e. the North), hence being considered by many Southerners as a traitor to their cause.