XXX Международный конгресс ИИСАА. 19–21 июня 2019 г. Т. 1

Источниковедение и историография Арабских стран к 150-летию академика В. В. Бартольда (1869–1930). Ч. 1 117 died in 1092, i.e. five years before the Crusaders arrived to the Middle East, and his death was followed by the actual disintegration of the Seljuq state. However, while we know that the disintegration of the empire was conclusive, this does not mean that the contemporaries knew — or even guessed — it. The disjunction of the state during a struggle for the sultanship was quite a standard event both for the nomadic societies of the Eurasian steppes 1 and for the Middle East. The same process had taken place after the deaths of the previous sultans, Tughrul-Beg andAlp-Arslan. Thus, the people could rather expect a reunification of the empire after the struggle for power was concluded. After the defeat and death of Tutush (26 February 1095) —a rebellious uncle of the new Sultan Barkyaruq—his sons, Ridwan and Duqaq, duly recognised the authority of the new lord, thus, nominally, their lands returned under the control of the sultan. Besides, Barkyaruq, busy with other problems in the Persian heartland of his empire, where he later became deeply involved in the struggle with his new rivals, had no serious reasons to seek especially tight control over Syria, because the sons of his former rival, Tutush, could not be dangerous to the Sultan. They, being from the legal point of view younger, and thus “lower” in status than he, had no right to claim the sultanship (this lies in the old, basically nomadic, Seljuq tradition of succession, according to which power was transmitted to the eldest male of the ruling clan). Thus, the situation in Syria was a kind of mutual compromise, but the appearance of theCrusaders destroyed this unstable unity. When the Crusaders appeared under the walls of Antioch in 1097, Kurbuqa, the loyal governor of Mosul and the representative of the Sultan in the western part of the empire, was sent by Barkyaruq to Syria. The Syrian emirs duly joined the Sultan’s commander; however, they had their own — local — agenda. Their aim was not a victory over the enemy, but preserving the status quo , i.e. keeping intact their recently acquired autonomy . From such a point of view, the victory of the Sultan’s commander would be incomparably more dangerous for the emerging independence of the Syrian emirs than the success of newcomers. In the case of Kurbuqa’s victory, the Sultan’s nominal dominion over Syria would become a real one. To avoid this, the emirs deserted their commander at the very first opportunity, which occurred during the pitched battle with the Crusaders under the walls of Antioch on 28 June 1098 2 . (The story was told by Ibn al-Athir 3 , though Edinburgh University Press, 1999 ( passim ) , though even there the collapse of the Seljuq Empire is understood as an event immediately preceding the coming of the Crusaders. 1 See a perfect analysis of this phenomenon in the article by Joseph Fletcher. The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives // HJAS, XLVI/1 (1986). P. 11–50. 2 See: Матвеев А. С. Крестовые походы: взгляд западных и восточных источни- ков // Гуманитарная наука в России: Соросовские лауреаты. Т.2: История, археология, культурная антропология и этнография. М., 1996. C. 98–108; Matveev A. A propos the causes of the success of the First Crusade: An Oriental point of view. International Medieval Congress ‘98. Leeds (UK), 3–16 July 1998. (Abstracts). 3 Ibn al-Athīr. Al-Kāmil fī l-ta’rīkh : Ibn-el-Athiri chronicon quod perfectissimum inscrib- itur. Ed. Carl J. Tornberg. Lugduni Batavorum: E. J. Brill, 1864. V. X. P. 189.

RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MzQwMDk=