Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

III. Far East, South and South-East Asia / Дальний Восток, Южная и Юго-Восточная Азия 332 Proceedings of the International Congress on Historiography and Source Studies of Asia and Africa.Vol. I. 2020 в результате углубляющейся «холодной войны», как дополнительные факторы, препятствовавшие успеху заседаний Комиссии. Учитывая влияние последнего фактора, мы ставим под сомнение, могли ли два соперника в «холодной войне» преуспеть в воссоединении полуострова, даже если бы Совместной комиссии удалось наладить процесс формирования единого временного правительства на полуострове. Ключевые слова: Советский Союз; Соединенные Штаты; Корея; Совмест- ная советско-американская комиссия 1946–1947 гг.; Московское совещание; объединение Кореи. In late December 1945 the foreign ministers of the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed on a plan to unify the Korean peninsula that had been divided since the previous August by Soviet and U.S. occupations in the north and south respectively. The formula that they created appeared rather straightforward: The two occupying forces would form a Joint Commission that would work with Korean democratic political parties and social organizations to form a provisional government as a first step toward electing a permanent Korean government. This body would be guided for up to five years by a four-nation trusteeship (The Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China) to direct the new government toward developing strong political and economic institutions. The Joint Commission that formed enjoyed a number of successes, but in the end failed to agree on the most basic of questions: What constituted a democratic political and social organization? Their failure consequently strengthened North-South Korean divisions, encouraged separate elections, and fortified the two Korean state framework that remains to this day. Despite the importance of the Commission’s efforts, and the rich trove of documents that the meetings produced, very little in-depth research had appeared in this historiography. This lack of significant interest in such an important issue may be the conviction that the talks’ failure was a foregone conclusion from the start, their commencing as U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated and the Cold War set in. Brief mentions of the meetings in the English literature argue the Soviet Union’s participation as driven by internal interests that sought a short-term solution that maintained peninsular division, and anticipated a long-term goal of complete peninsular communization. This paper sees this conclusion as premature, one drawn without full exploitation of the documents available. It also ignores public statements left by Joseph Stalin and other Soviet officials that suggest views to the contrary, that the Soviet Union favored a quick, non-military occupation that guided Koreans to sovereignty. Do Joint Commission documents suggest otherwise? Can it be concluded that United States interests, themselves, were purely altruistic? What role did Korean play in influencing this process? Were there external forces that factored into the meetings’ failure as well?