Доклады Международного конгресса ИИСАА. Т. 1

Доклады Международного конгресса по источниковедению и историографии стран Азии и Африки. Т. 1. 2020 361 Evgeniy V. Kobelev, Vladimir M. Mazyrin (Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS, Moscow, Russia) On the role of the Soviet Union in the anti-American war in Vietnam (1965–1975) and Attempts to Falsify History Summary: The article contributes to the historiography of the anti-American war in Vietnam during its most important stage of 1968–1973 — the Paris peace talks. New sources and approaches to this topic, including attempts to interpret it from pro-Chinese positions, are also considered. In the first part the authors showhow somemodern scholars interpret today the role of the USSR in this war and its ending. In particular, the article refutes the allegations that the Soviet Union took a moderate, conciliatory position on Vietnam, did not support major military operations in the South, pushed Hanoi to make peace with the United States, looked with indifference at American acts of aggression, colluded with President Nixon, and the like. Besides, the authors analyze allegations that DRV diplomacy achieved success through their own efforts, while the Soviet Union’s impact on the course of events at that time should not be overestimated; that Hanoi did not ask the USSR for military assistance; that the Paris agreement became an obstacle to the reunification of Vietnam and served the interests of the United States, etc. Some other erroneous statements popular among modern Vietnamese scholars are also discussed, including those hinting at Moscow’s betrayal of the interests of its Vietnam ally, or at least forcing it to sign peace agreement with the US. These assess- ments openly belittle the role of the USSR in the DRV negotiations with American representatives and the successful signing of the Paris agreement. Attempts to rewrite the history of the war in Vietnam are natural for experts and politicians of the United States, however, it is surprising to found them in the works of the Vietnamese scholars. Possibly, this approach is dictated by new strategic interests of Hanoi. Some Western experts’ opinions on the division of the Vietnamese leaders by fractions, their different approaches to the issues of war and peace, and total “depen- dence on Moscow” are also critisized. The authors’ conclusions are based on recent publications of the Institute of Far Eastern studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, unknown Vietnamese archives and direct evidence of a participant of the negotiation process. An objective com- parison of dubious “discoveries” and real events shows instances of falsification of history, as well as reveals the position of the official Hanoi today, some aspects of which are unexpected.